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PROSECUTING FOREIGN BRIBERY IN
NATIONAL PROJECTS: A MULTI-
PHASED APPROACH TO REDUCE
CORRUPTION
JULIA E. JOHNSON*
“Without strong watchdog institutions, impunity becomes the very
foundation upon which systems of corruption are built. And if impunity
is not demolished, all efforts to bring an end to corruption are in vain.”
– Rigoberta Menchú Tum (2001).
1
The gradual establishment of an international mechanism to review
and prosecute allegations of corruption could help to deter fraudulent
conduct. Fraudulent conduct often reduces the economic benefits
associated with large-scale development or investment projects.
2
These
projects are generally awarded through contract bidding; the bidding
outcome may be dictated by bribery and other corrupt behaviors by
local officials overseeing the project. The money earmarked for the
project may in turn be siphoned off to the bribe recipients for private
gain, leaving citizens unable to appreciate the fruits of any such
project. For this reason, reducing corruption should remain a key
priority. Many national jurisdictions have a vested interest in reducing
corruption, yet lack the capacity and political stability to reduce
corruption through domestic efforts.
3
International efforts to reduce
corruption, as evidenced by previous attempts at developing new, topic-
specific, stand-alone international courts, have also been insufficient.
4
* J.D., Duke University School of Law. The author would like to thank her former
colleagues at the World Bank for their input on this article.
1. Global Corruption Report 2001, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, https://iss
uu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/2001_gcr_inaugural_en (Oct. 13, 2001).
2. See Combatting Corruption, THE WORLD BANK [hereinafter Combatting
Corruption], http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption (last
updated Oct. 4, 2018).
3. See id. (describing consequences of corruption).
4. See Marie Chêne, Successful Anti-Corruption Reforms, TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
1, 4 (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/
Successful_anti-corruption_reforms.pdf; see also Maíra Martini, Anti-Corruption
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Mindful of the mixed results of previous anti-corruption efforts, this
Article proposes a new anti-corruption framework, based upon a
hybrid, multi-phased approach. The approach is pragmatic, flexible,
cost-effective, and realistic.
Step-by-Step Approach:
1. Create a new, unified anti-corruption and anti-bribery
prosecutorial sanctions board and system for national
governments, multilateral development banks (“MDBs”), and
United Nations (“U.N.”) agencies to investigate and prosecute
allegations of fraudulent conduct. The specific structure of the
unified board is not described in depth here, but the envisioned
structure would be changed over time pursuant to its charter such
that it transitions into a more involved governing body that
prosecutes both government and civilian corruption. As the board
gains legitimacy, jurisdiction will be gradually expanded pursuant
to ratification by its signatories.
2. Install requirements for information sharing by pursuing joint
investigations and case oversight efforts. These requirements will
facilitate the new board’s access to information and serve as a
potential conduit for information sharing between national
agencies facing cross-border corruption.
3. Expand the board to oversee civil administrative actions against
civil servants accused of bribery and corruption. National judicial
and legal systems would assist with enforcing decisions issued by
the board.
4. Expand the board to oversee criminal bribery and corruption cases
against civil servants as well as certain outside matters brought
before the board. The precise parameters of this jurisdiction are
not explored here. The intention for such a board at this phase is
to prosecute civil and criminal wrongdoing by civil servants and
would not prosecute allegations of wrongdoing by private actors.
5. Once the board has gained legitimacy and has developed
efficiency, an international anti-corruption “court” may be
created, though the proposed structure should not carry the
rigidities associated with prior efforts to create an international
prosecutorial body. Instead, provisions must be installed to ensure
that the court remains fiscally effective and practical. At this point,
the court’s jurisdiction would include prosecution of civil and
Specialisation: Law Enforcement and Courts, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 1, 8–10 (Jan. 28,
2014), https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Anti-corruption
_specialisation_Law_enforcment_and_courts_2014.pdf (analyzing the effectiveness of
specialized corruption courts in Croatia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia).
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criminal wrongdoing by civil servants relating to large-scale
projects associated with MDBs, U.N. agencies, and similar entities,
as well as prosecution of large-scale cross-border corruption for
which a national government may be unable to adequately address
without outside assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Corruption, which is particularly rampant in developing nations, reduces
the benefits associated with large-scale projects. By some metrics, global
38 AMERICANUNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW Vol. 9:1
corruption by public officials causes losses measuring approximately one
trillion dollars annually.
5
Corruption, spurn out of human proclivities for
greed and desire for illicit gain, is unlikely to ever be wholly eradicated
even under the most effective legal framework. However, with proper
safeguards, international corruption and its corresponding losses can be
significantly reduced. To achieve this goal, a hybrid, multi-phased
approach must be employed.
Before refining the existing anti-corruption framework, a general
explanation of certain laws and treaties is warranted. In the private sector,
the national governments are responsible for prosecution of corruption
associated with large-scale projects. There are international treaties that
require signatory nations to adopt anti-corruption laws within their
jurisdictions. There is, however, no supranational overarching mechanism
investigating and prosecuting international corruption, particularly as it
affects the procurement and development of large-scale projects that
require government participation.
Like private sector procurement anti-corruption efforts which are largely
prosecuted by national governments, corruption associated with bidding
awards by multilateral development banks (“MDBs”) is also prosecuted in
a piecemeal fashion — current anti-corruption efforts are typically
comprised of debarment sanctions honored through reciprocity.
6
These
treaties are fragmented in nature, with differing obligations at the national
and international levels.
7
For example, a development bank may have a
sanctions board that will sanction a particular entity once it is found to have
engaged in corruption. Other sanctions boards need not necessarily
consider the decisions imposed by another sanctioning entity and may
instead chose to award certain large-scale contracts notwithstanding prior
evidence of corruption and bribery. To this end, a unified sanctions board,
comprised of a prosecutorial body and utilizing the assistance of national
police and judicial assistance, may assist with deterring corrupt behaviors
in large-scale, cross-border projects, as well as other acts of civil service
5. See Rodrigo Campos, Corruption Costs $1 Trillion in Tax Revenue Globally:
IMF, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2019, 10:10 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-imf-
corruption/corruption-costs-1-trillion-in-tax-revenue-globally-imf-idUSKCN1RG1R2.
6. See generally THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK GROUP’S SANCTIONS
REGIME: INFORMATION NOTE [hereinafter INFORMATION NOTE], http://sitere
sourves.worldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resourcces/The_World_Bank_Group_Sanc
tions_Regims.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2020) (describing World Bank’s cross-
debarment policy, through which an MDB can sanction a party that has already been
sanctioned by another MDB).
7. See id. at 9 (explaining that MDBs may opt out of debarment decisions as part
of the Bank’s cross-debarment policy).
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corruption for which a national government (or, if the bidding award was
issued by an MDB, its respective sanctions board) may be unable to
adequately prosecute.
First, this Article reviews the need for an international anti-corruption
enforcement body by reviewing the prevalence of corruption. Second, this
Article considers the limitations of similar stand-alone, international courts.
Third, this Article proposes creation of a new, unified prosecutorial
sanctions board to oversee the review instances of corruption and bribery,
as well as the possible use of certain enforcement mechanisms at the
national and international level. Fourth, this Article discusses the need for
a gradual phased expansion of the proposed sanctions system. Particularly,
this Article will focus on the need for information sharing among and
between agencies and national governments and the proposed board. It
will further note the weaknesses inherent in the existing systems and ways
to address them.
Lastly, the Article proposes a multi-phased approach for establishing an
international mechanism for prosecuting corruption cases, including the
creation of a new international anti-corruption court. The suggested
framework could be expanded over time to address administrative actions
and criminal cases against civil servants. As the anti-corruption court gains
legitimacy, the court could also investigate and prosecute acts of corruption
affecting both the private and public sectors. The court’s jurisdiction
should be described in its charter and ratified by its signatories as its
authority increases.
II. SCALE OF THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION
Despite its significant effect on the efficacy of development projects and
the quality of life of the affected persons, corruption cannot be
encapsulated by a single definition.
A. Definition of Corruption
Scholar Linn Hammergren defines corruption as the “abuse or misuse of
public resources” (material resources, including funds and equipment, and
less tangible resources such as power, decision-making authority, and
position) for “private benefit.”
8
Corruption is defined under the World
8. See Linn Hammergren, The Multilateral Development Banks and Judicial
Corruption, 9 CTR. FOR INDEPENDENCE JUDGES & LAWS. Y.B. 73, 75 (2000) (defining
corruption as “abuse or misuse of public resources for private benefit” and explaining
that objects of corruption include both material and nonmaterial resources, corrupt
actors often include both public and private sector officials, and examples of corruption
include kickbacks for government contracts and favorable legislation).
40 AMERICANUNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW Vol. 9:1
Bank Guidelines as “[t]he offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, directly
or indirectly, of anything of value to influence improperly the actions of
another party.”
9
Wrongdoing by recipients of large-scale projects can be
one of several forms, including bribery, collusion, fraudulent practices, and
obstruction.
10
In addition, Article 1 of the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) Anti-Bribery Convention defines
corruption as:
any person intentionally to offer, promise or given any undue pecuniary
or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a
foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order that
the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of
official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper
advantage in the conduct of international business.
11
Corruption may be one of many types — it may be (1) “mutual or
unilateral,” (2) “‘soft’ or ‘hard,’” and (3) found in the contract’s
procurement or as the contract’s objective.
12
Unilateral corruption means
that only one party is involved, whereas multilateral corruption means that
both the benefactor and the recipient are fully aware of the corrupt
behavior.
13
Mutual corruption is seldom grounds for defense against a
corruption allegation; unilateral corruption is more likely to be a valid
defense.
14
Similarly, whether corruption is hard or soft is determined by
9. Guidelines on Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption in Projects
Financed by IBRD Loan and IDA Credits and Grants, THE WORLD BANK 3 (July 1,
2016), https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/40394039anti-corrupti
on%20guidelines%20(as%20revised%20as%20of%20july%201,%202016).pdf.
10. See The World Bank Borrowers, Guidelines — Procurement of Goods, Works,
and Non-Consulting Services, 6 ¶ 1.16(a)(i)–(iv) (revised July 2014) [hereinafter
Guidelines] (defining corrupt practice, fraudulent practice, collusive practice, and
coercive practice).
11. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions art. 1 ¶ 1, Nov. 21, 1997, OECD [hereinafter OECD Art. 1].
12. See Michael A. Losco, Streamlining the Corruption Defense: A Proposed
Framework for FCPA-ICSID Interaction, 63 DUKE L.J. 1201, 1218 (2014); see also
Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
33 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83, 87 (2007) (describing legislation passed by
Congress in response to an SEC investigation that discovered questionable payments
made by U.S. firms to foreign governments).
13. See Fragport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, ¶ 332 (Aug. 16, 2007) (holding multilateral
corruption present where both parties were knowingly aware of an illegal intent). See
generally ANDREAS KULICK, GLOBAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 18 (2012) (emphasizing the importance of differentiating between multilateral and
unilateral conduct when categorizing case law and explaining that corruption is usually
multilateral while fraud is usually unilateral).
14. See, e.g., World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/7, Award, ¶¶ 156–57 (Aug. 31, 2006) (holding that even where it was alleged
2020 PROSECUTING FOREIGN BRIBERY IN NATIONAL PROJECTS 41
the degree of interference. For instance, hard corruption often takes the
form of an explicit offer by a benefactor made to a public official or other
individual for some improper motive; hard corruption need not occur
directly and may occur through an intermediary.
15
In contrast, soft
corruption is an indirect form of corruption and involves the utilization of a
middleman who alleges that he or she may be able to “influence peddle”
another public official who wields authority.
16
Three out of four foreign
bribery cases involve intermediaries.
17
B. Measure of Corruption
In 2014, the OECD estimated that the losses caused by public official
corruption measured a trillion dollars per year.
18
The World Bank has
likewise suggested that about twenty to forty percent of financial assistance
provided for development in the poorest countries is squandered from the
national public budget through corruption.
19
Corrupt deals account for more than five percent of the global GDP.
20
The World Bank’s research estimates that “around [$]20 billion to [$]40
billion a year — a figure equivalent to 15–30% of all Official Development
Assistance” is lost due to bribery.
21
The effects of foreign bribery are
corruption may be widespread within the particular sector of activity, the legal
consequences are not to be altered).
15. See OECD Art. 1, supra note 10, ¶ 1; KULICK, supra note 13, at 309
(explaining that hard corruption requires an intentional act meant to gain an “undue
advantage”).
16. Losco, supra note 12, at 1220; Hilmar Raeschke-Kessler & Dorothee Gottwald,
Corruption in Foreign Investment — Contracts and Dispute Settlement Between
Investors, States, and Agents, 9 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 5, 7 (2008) (defining influence
peddling).
17. See THE WORLD BANK OFFICE OF SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT, REPORT ON
FUNCTIONS, DATA AND LESSONS LEARNED 2007-2013 29 (2014).
18. OECD, ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MEASURING
OECD RESPONSES 73 (2014) [hereinafter MEASURING OECD RESPONSES],
https://www.oecd.org/corruption/Illicit_Financial_Flows_from_Developing_Countries.
pdf.
19. OECD, The Rationale for Fighting Corruption, CLEANGOVBIZ (2014)
[hereinafter The Rationale for Fighting Corruption], http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/
49693613.pdf (“The World Bank (Baker 2005) estimates that each year US$ 20 to US
$ 40 of official development assistance, is stolen through high-level corruption from
public budgets in developing countries and hidden overseas.”).
20. See Mark L. Wolf, The Case for an International Anti-Corruption Court,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION: GOVERNANCE STUDIES 1, 8–9 (July 23, 2014), https://
www.brookings.edu/research/the-case-for-an-international-anti-corruption-court/.
21. MEASURINGOECDRESPONSES, supra note 18, at 73 (“A $1 million dollar bribe
can quickly amount to a USD 100 million loss to a poor country through derailed
projects and inappropriate investment decisions which undermine development.”).
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particularly pronounced in developing countries: between the years 2000
and 2009, corrupt financial practices resulted in $8.4 trillion in losses in
these nations.
22
Corruption also impacts the national economy through metrics that are
less easily quantified. In addition to reducing cash flows, the harms caused
by corruption comprise decelerated economic development and a number
of trade flows issues, such as effects on public service and public
procurement bids, including those for necessities such as electricity, roads,
and water.
23
Foreign corruption is often concentrated within certain
industry sectors, including transportation, mining, and infrastructure,
24
causing artificial economic imbalances in these industry sectors.
25
OECD
research has found that corruption and bribery may result in excessive
investment in more lucrative sectors such as large-scale infrastructure
projects, while other less profitable sectors, such as education and public
sector social programs, lose funding.
26
Corruption constitutes a major impediment to economic development
and growth.
27
As one example of this impediment, corruption increases
transaction costs associated with doing business by increasing the
uncertainty of the return on an investment.
28
Heightened uncertainty
reduces both domestic and foreign investors’ desire to invest.
29
Corruption
causes instability that frequently reduces economic growth.
30
The
22. Wolf, supra note 20, at 3 (noting that “[a]n estimated $8.4 trillion was lost in
developing regions due to illicit financial flows between 2000 and 2009, which was ten
times more than those regions received in foreign aid, and roughly the annual GDP of
China in 2012.”).
23. MEASURINGOECDRESPONSES, supra note 18, at 73.
24. OCED, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND CORRUPTION 20 (2018),
https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/state-owned-enterprises-and-corruption_9789
264303058-en#page21.
25. See Hamid Davoodi & Vito Tanzi, Roads to Nowhere: How Corruption in
Public Investment Hurts Growth, INT’L MONETARY FUND 6 (Mar. 1998),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues12/index.htm.
26. The Rationale for Fighting Corruption, supra note 19, at 2–3; see also Wolf,
supra note 20, at 4, 12 (“[C]orruption is an enormous obstacle to the realization of all
human rights — civil, political, economic, social, and cultural, as well as the right to
development.”).
27. See Combatting Corruption, supra note 2 (contending that corruption impedes
investment and undermines the social contract with government).
28. See id. (describing the costliness of corruption in international financial flows);
see also The Rationale for Fighting Corruption, supra note 19, at 2.
29. Combatting Corruption, supra note 2 (“Corruption impedes investment, with
consequent effects on growth and jobs.”).
30. JUNE S. BEITTEL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45733, COMBATTING
CORRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA: CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 15–16 (2019),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45733 (stating scholars report that
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instability brought about by this uncertainty is particularly harmful for
developing countries where other forces of economic uncertainty have
already dampened some investors’ willingness to invest in a particular
region.
31
Funds lost to corruption frequently detract from other societal
efforts, such as reducing crime.
32
For example, police officers may refuse
to perform routine services without bribes.
33
Bribery may impute bias to
public works when the government officials improperly select the winning
bidder.
34
Corruption may also affect institutions that are intended to serve
the public.
35
Without addressing each type of corruption, meaningful
change cannot occur.
36
Corruption’s effects are ascertainable on a macroeconomic level.
Corruption can reduce the efficacy of government initiatives, result in
heightened levels of terrorism, and reduce or render ineffective the integrity
of nascent democracies.
37
Corruption may also reduce trade flows into
developing nations, which may in turn negatively affect their economic
growth.
38
Lastly, government corruption frequently crosses party lines: as
one domestic regime loses power in a nation, the regime is often replaced
by a new government that will likewise succumb to corruption.
39
The most vulnerable victims of corruption are those most likely to suffer
corruption affects developing countries’ ability to obtain loans, lowers economic
competitiveness, reduces GDP, and encourages migration).
31. The Rationale for Fighting Corruption, supra note 19, at 2.
32. BEITTEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 15.
33. Combating Corruption, supra note 2.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Phillippa Webb, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: Global
Achievement or Missed Opportunity?, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 191, 192 (2005); see Dileep
Nair, Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services, Secretary-General’s
Message to the Third Global Forum on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity
(May 29, 2003), www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2003-05-29/secretary-generals
-message-third-global-forum-fighting-corruption (emphasizing the broad negative
consequences of corruption and the United Nations’ role in addressing these
externalities).
38. See Bert Denolf, Impact of Corruption on Foreign Direct Investment, 9 J.
WORLD INV. & TRADE 249, 249, 253–55, 261–62, 264, 269, 271 (2008) (identifying the
levels and nature of corruption as operative variables when predicting the negative
effects of corruption of foreign direct investment).
39. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Establishing the Rule of Law, in WHEN STATES FAIL:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 182, 185 (Robert Rotberg ed., Princeton University Press
2004) (illustrating how the consolidated systems of power are abused by replacement
governments in a similar manner to how the incumbent government abused those
systems).
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its effects.
40
Empirical studies have found that in Paraguay, the poor lose
on average 12.6 percent of their income to bribes, while high-income
families lose 6.4 percent.
41
Similarly, in Sierra Leone, the poor lose on
average thirteen percent of their income to bribes, while high-income
families lose 3.8 percent.
42
Likewise, the African Union has found that
twenty-five percent of the continent’s GDP is lost to corruption annually.
43
While poor nations are most affected by corruption, wealthier countries,
where the pecuniary ramifications are less severe, are also affected as the
public loses faith in its leaders and government institutions lose
legitimacy.
44
Former U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald has stated that
America’s corruption victims are “both those who are shaken down for
bribes and kickbacks, and the members of the general public, who pay for
corruption through inflated costs and loss of faith in government.”
45
Corruption, while not specific to any particular nation, often affects
developing nations. According to the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (“GAO”), these nations share certain “fundamental challenges” that
foster corruption.
46
These challenges include “low civil service salaries, a
lack of transparency and accountability in government operations,
ineffective legal frameworks and law enforcement, weak judicial systems,
and tolerant public attitudes.”
47
A number of recent high-profile scandals
spanning numerous developing countries have shown that action to address
corruption must be taken now.
48
These nations’ inability to adequately address corruption leads to a
40. BEITTEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 15.
41. Combating Corruption, supra note 2.
42. Id.
43. Karen Alter & Juliet Sorensen, Let Nations, Not the World, Prosecute
Corruption, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.usnews.com
/opinion/articles/2014/04/30/dont-add-corruption-to-the-international-criminal-courts-
mandate.
44. See id. (detailing corruption leads to inflated costs in wealthier nations such as
the United States).
45. Id.
46. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO-04-506, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE:
U.S. ANTICORRUPTION PROGRAMS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICANWILL REQUIRE TIME AND
COMMITMENT (Apr. 2004), https://www.gao.gov/assets/250/242162.pdf (indicating
pervasive corruption in sub-Saharan Africa). In July 2004, the General Accounting
Office changed its name to the Government Accountability Office.
47. Id.
48. See JUNE S. BEITTEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10802, SPOTLIGHT ON PUBLIC
CORRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA, (Jan. 9, 2018) [hereinafter BEITTEL, SPOTLIGHT ON
PUBLIC CORRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA], https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/
IF/IF10802.
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reduction in foreign investment.
49
This occurs because politicians
overseeing public works bidding often expect a payout or other
remuneration to award a project to a particular bidder.
50
The perception of
public corruption, in turn, reduces outside direct investment.
51
As one example, Latin America has been particularly befallen by
corruption, which has stifled economic growth in the region.
52
The 2016
CPI reported that “nearly a third of all Latin American respondents said
they had paid a bribe for a public service such as health care or education in
the past twelve months.”
53
Corruption has deepened Latin American
inequality and weakened the region’s ability to provide public services.
54
In Latin American nations where corruption runs rampant, economic
performance has failed to keep pace with foreign direct investment
(“FDI”).
55
For example, El Salvador’s low FDI flows have been attributed,
in part, to the nation’s high levels of corruption.
56
Similarly, in Mexico, corruption has been estimated to cost the country
up to five percent of its gross domestic production annually.
57
The name of
the incumbent Institutional Revolutionary Party has become tantamount
with corruption.
58
Moreover, no fewer than eight of Mexico’s state
governors have come under investigation for corruption.
59
Mexican
officials are also thought to have played a role in the 2014 disappearance of
forty-three students who went missing in Guerrero.
60
By contrast, Brazil’s comparatively higher FDI flows have been
49. See BEITTEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 15 (noting that World Economic Forum
has found a nation’s inability to address corruption serves as a “barrier to investment”).
50. See id. at 2, 13, 16 (detailing corrupt ways in which politicians distort the
public-works bidding process in exchange for money or political favors).
51. See id. at 16 (attributing Chile’s success in achieving growth and foreign
investment to the nation’s low level of perceived corruption).
52. BEITTEL, SPOTLIGHT ON PUBLIC CORRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 48
(highlighting the growing awareness of corruption in Latin America’s public services
that is interfering with economic growth “through lost productivity and skewed
incentives”).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. BEITTEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 15.
56. Id.; see also Klaus Schwab, Global Competitiveness Report 2018, THE WORLD
ECON. FORUM 209 (Oct. 16, 2018), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2018/05Full
Report/TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2018.pdf.
57. BEITTEL, SPOTLIGHT ON PUBLIC CORRUPTION IN LATINAMERICA, supra note 48.
58. Id. at 13 (“In Mexico, corruption investigations of 20 former state governors,
most from the PRI, diminished the party’s legacy.”).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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attributed to its use of the judiciary to staunchly prosecute corruption.
61
By
way of further example, Chile has attracted high levels of FDI, which may
be partially attributed to the perception that it provides a non-corrupt
business climate.
62
When corruption scandals took place in 2015 and 2017,
the country worked quickly to avoid damage to this reputation.
63
The private sector, which is often reactive to market forces, has also been
ineffective in reducing corruption.
64
The private sector can play a key role
in reducing corruption by “demanding clean, non-corrupt governance and
can serve as [a] strong advocate[] for laws to prohibit bribery and extortion
to end the distorted impact of corruption on competition.”
65
Indeed, the
strength of the business community to both positively and negatively affect
corruption is already evident. In some instances, private sector
heavyweights have promoted anti-bribery legislation in Latin America.
66
For example, in Mexico, COPARMEX — a business association — has
advocated for full implementation of the National Anti-Corruption
System.
67
One of the most significant developments of this system would
be the creation of an independent prosecutor’s office.
68
Business leaders in
other nations, such as Honduras and Guatemala, by contrast, have taken
steps to reduce the efficacy of anti-corruption controls.
69
C. Human Rights and Corruption
Corruption is frequently linked to human rights infractions because of its
effect on the economic and quality of life metrics for the persons affected.
Corruption can sharply reduce the quality of life and overall wellbeing of
individuals residing in both developed and developing nations.
70
Research
has linked higher rates of corruption with poorer performance on public
health indicators, such as infant mortality and immunization rates.
71
The
consequences of corruption include lower life expectancy rates, poorer
61. BEITTEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 15.
62. Id. at 16.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 15.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (referring to examples of corruption in Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and
Colombia).
71. Maureen Lewis, Governance and Corruption in Public Health Care Systems,
CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV. (Jan. 2006), http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anti
corrupt/Corruption%20WP_78.pdf.
2020 PROSECUTING FOREIGN BRIBERY IN NATIONAL PROJECTS 47
nutrition, and reduced access to education and healthcare facilities for both
adults and children.
72
Corruption also obstructs access to public amenities
and reduces the efficacy of local initiatives aimed at reducing poverty and
improving national wellbeing.
73
In some cases, impoverished individuals
may be excluded from using public amenities altogether.
74
D. Corruption as an International Legal Crime
Due to the adverse human rights impacts and inefficiencies of
prosecuting corruption domestically, corruption is often considered an
international crime.
75
By reducing the quality of life for already impoverished populations,
corruption becomes a causative factor in human rights violations, leading
some scholars to believe it should be classified as an international legal
crime.
76
As one scholar has noted, “corruption is directly connected to a
violation of human rights when the corrupt act is delivery used as a means
to violate the right . . . [f]or example, when an individual must bribe a
doctor in order to obtain medical treatment, or bribe a teacher in order to be
allowed to attend a class, his right of access to health and education has
been infringed by corruption.”
77
Providing a less direct example, if a
corrupt government allows environmental contamination or degradation, it
will result in toxic waste or cause harmful environmental conditions.
78
Though not every incident of corruption causes a human rights violation,
many forms of corruption materially reduce the quality of life for
impoverished populations. Under this approach, corruption can constitute
an international legal crime when human dignities are harmed.
79
72. Ben Bloom, Comment, Criminalizing Kleptocracy? The ICC As a Viable Tool
in the Fight Against Grand Corruption, 29 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 627, 655–56 (2015)
(outlining consequences of grand corruption).
73. Id.
74. The Rationale for Fighting Corruption, supra note 19, at 3 (explaining that the
poor could be “excluded from basic services like health care or education” because
they cannot afford to pay for bribes requested from a corrupt government).
75. See generally Ilias Bantekas, Corruption as an International Crime and Crime
Against Humanity: An Outline of Supplementary Criminal Justice Policies, 4 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUSTICE 466 (2006) (noting the criminalization of transnational corrupt practices
is now an international offense).
76. See Julio Bacio-Terracino, Linking Corruption and Human Rights, 104 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 243, 243 (2010); see also Joel M. Ngugi, Making the Link
Between Corruption and Human Rights: Promises and Perils, 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 246, 246, 249–50 (2010).
77. Bacio-Terracino, supra note 76, at 243–44.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 243.
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As one example, the United States has defined “international crime” as
“criminal conduct that transcends national borders and threatens U.S.
interests in three broad, interrelated categories: threats to Americans and
their communities, threats to American businesses and financial
institutions, and threats to global security and stability.”
80
U.S. GAO
guidance has stated that the following actions constitute international
crimes:
corruption; terrorism; drug trafficking; illegal immigration and alien
smuggling; trafficking in women and children; environmental crimes
(including flora and fauna trafficking); sanctions violations; illicit
technology transfers and smuggling of materials for weapons of mass
destruction; arms trafficking; trafficking in precious gems; piracy; non-
drug contraband smuggling; intellectual property rights violations;
foreign economic espionage; foreign corrupt business practices;
counterfeiting; financial fraud (including advance fee scams and credit
card fraud); high-tech crime; and money laundering.
81
Multiple international agreements address the issue of corruption and
provide further evidence that corruption is an international legal crime and
is treated as such. For example, the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption (“UNCAC”) provides in Article 36 that signatory countries
must “ensure the existence of a body or bodies of personnel specialized in
combating corruption through law enforcement.”
82
Likewise, the Council
of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention states in Article 20 that “[e]ach
party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to ensure that persons
or entities are specialised in the fight against corruption.”
83
Further, the
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Resolution 97 (24), in the
Twenty Guiding Principles For the Fight Against Corruption, in Principles
3 and 7, provides for “the establishment of a specialised, independent, well-
trained and adequately resourced body to fight corruption.”
84
However, not all scholars agree that corruption should be classified as a
crime against humanity. First, according to some scholars, it is unclear
whether Article 7(i)(k) of the Rome Statute “is broad enough to allow
80. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-01-629, INTERNATIONAL CRIME
CONTROL: SUSTAINED EXECUTIVE-LEVEL COORDINATION OF FEDERAL RESPONSE
NEEDED 16 (2001).
81. Id.
82. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, art. 36, Oct. 31, 2003, G.A.
Res. 58/4, 2349 U.N.T.S. 161.
83. Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, art. 20, Jan. 27,
1999, https://rm.coe.int/168007f3f5.
84. Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Resolution 97 (24), Twenty
Guiding Principles for the Fight Against Corruption, 3, 7, Nov. 6, 1997,
https://polis.osce.org/node/4681.
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inclusion of grand corruption as a prosecutable crime against humanity.”
85
If grand corruption does not fall within the Rome Statute, the statute will
need to be amended, which requires that two-thirds of the Member States’
votes.
86
Corrupt governments may not be willing to support amending the
Rome Statute.
87
Further, even if Article 7 were amended, not all nations,
but only those nations that voted for the change, would be subject to its
enforcement.
88
Consequently, the nations most marred by corruption may
also be the least likely to be bound by any amendment.
89
Under the second approach, the Elements of Crimes could be amended to
enable grand corruption to be defined as a crime against humanity, which is
also likely to be contested in the Assembly of States parties and would
require a two-thirds majority vote.
90
Another approach would be to petition
the Office of the Prosecutor to “utilize prosecutorial discretion to interpret
Article 7(k) to include grand corruption . . . .”
91
However, some scholars
have suggested that this approach could face backlash in the ICC's judicial
chambers.
92
E. National Legislation Presents Stand-Alone Efforts to Reduce Corruption
National legislation has presented stand-alone efforts to reduce
corruption. For example, the U.K. passed the 2010 Bribery Act, which
85. Steven Groves et al., Why the U.S. Should Oppose the Creation of an
International Anti-Corruption Court, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 1, 2014),
https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/why-the-us-should-oppose-the-creation-
international-anti-corruption-court.
86. Id.
87. See id.
88. See id.; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, 121,
121(5), July 17, 1998 (corrected 2002), 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544 (“Any amendment to
articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force for those States Parties which
have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of
ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State Party which has not accepted the
amendment, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by
the amendment when committed by that State Party’s nations or on its territory.”).
89. Groves et al., supra note 85.
90. Id.; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 9(1)–(2)(c),
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544 (entered into force July 1, 2002) (“Elements of
Crimes shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6,7, and 8.
They shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly of
States Parties.”); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 9(1)–(2)(c),
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544 (entered into force July 1, 2002) (“Amendments to
the Elements of Crimes may be proposed by: (a) Any State Party; (b) The judges
acting by an absolute majority; (c) The Prosecutor. Such amendments shall be adopted
by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly of States Parties.”).
91. Groves et al., supra note 85; see also Bloom, supra note 72, at 667–71.
92. Groves et al., supra note 85.
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took effect in July 2011.
93
The U.K. Anti-Bribery Act “criminalizes both
commercial bribery and bribery of foreign public officials for all
companies doing business in the United Kingdom and for all U.K. citizens
and companies doing business abroad.”
94
The U.K. Serious Fraud Office
has also recently strengthened its stance on corruption, stating that the self-
reporting of corruption is not sufficient in itself to prevent prosecution of
such acts.
95
Similarly, Mexico ratified the extraterritorial Federal Procurement Anti-
corruption Law, which imposes sanctions “against both foreign and
Mexican persons for corrupt practices relating to public contracts with both
the Mexican federal government and foreign governments as well,
including bribery occurring through a third party.”
96
Mexico’s law is
notable because it specifically criminalizes the act of offering a bribe,
irrespective of whether such a bribe was actually paid.
97
India has also passed anti-corruption laws, including the Prevention of
Corruption Act (1988) and the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act
(2002).
98
The 2011 Lokpal Bill (Prevention of Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials and Officials of Public international Organization Bill), which
remains stalled in India’s Parliament, is another example of the country’s
efforts to reduce corruption.
99
India’s anti-corruption laws criminalize
“both active and passive bribery” of foreign public leaders.
100
Similarly,
Indonesia ratified legislation to eradicate corruption in 2001 and has
recently proposed new anti-corruption laws that would prosecute acts of
bribery by foreign public officials and private sector corruption.
101
As described in further detail below, Brazil has also increased its efforts
to prosecute corruption. In addition to the existing legal framework
described above, Brazil’s current draft law, Responsibility of Legal Persons
93. See Gwendolyn L. Hassan, The Increasing Risk of Multijurisdictional Bribery
Prosecution: Why Having an FCPA Compliance Program Is No Longer Enough, 42
INT’L L. NEWS 11, 12 (2013) (stating that the Bribery Act is the most notable stand-
alone legislation to combat corruption).
94. See id. at 12 (highlighting that the Bribery Act is broad in scope and applies
extraterritorially).
95. See id. (altering key provisions related to self-disclosure because it is not a
guarantee of non-prosecution).
96. Id. (detailing that Mexico’s law applies extraterritorially as well).
97. Id.
98. Id. (explaining that India had not taken any measures to address the bribery of
foreign public officials until 2011).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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for Acts of Corruption (Bill 6,826/2010), “would establish the direct
liability of legal entities for acts for corruption committed by their
directors, officers, employees, and agents”
102
and “would also provide for
debarment from public contracting and fines of up to thirty percent of a
company’s income.”
103
Under current law, persons engaging in corruption
may be jailed for up to thirty years.
104
F. Corruption in Latin America — The Case of Lavo Jato
The Odebrecht scandal, known as Lavo Jato, which has touched multiple
Latin American nations, is perhaps one of the most high-profile recent
portrayals of public corruption.
105
In 2017, Odebrecht, a Brazilian
construction company, admitted that it had paid up to $800 million in
bribes over the prior two decades to secure public contracts throughout
Latin America valued at more than $3.3 billion.
106
Public officials in a
number of Latin American nations, including Mexico, Colombia, and
Panama, admitted accepting bribes.
107
Ecuador’s Vice President Jorge Glas
was convicted of accepting over $13 million in bribes from the company.
108
Further Peru’s President Pablo Kuczynski was nearly impeached after he
was accused of accepting bribes from Odebrecht.
109
In the wake of the Lavo Jato scandal, significant changes took place.
Former Brazilian President Michael Temer was arrested after allegations
surfaced that he had accepted $2 million in bribes from Odebrecht and had
engaged in money laundering after leaving office.
110
A number of other
senior Brazilian officials and business executives, including former
President Luiz Inácio Lul de Silva and Aécio Neves, were also arrested on
significant charges for accepting bribes in exchange for awarding certain
public contracts.
111
This systemic corruption was identified and
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id. (explaining that various existing provisions criminalize public officials
offering and accepting bribes).
105. BEITTEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 9–10 (stating that Brazil’s multinational
construction firm Odebrecht was involved in a landmark plea agreement and admitted
to paying millions in bribes to politicians and office holders throughout Latin
America).
106. Id. at 9; see also BEITTEL, SPOTLIGHT ON PUBLIC CORRUPTION IN LATIN
AMERICA, supra note 48.
107. BEITTEL, SPOTLIGHT ON PUBLIC CORRUPTION IN LATINAMERICA, supra note 48.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. BEITTEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 9–10 (noting that the President was protected
from investigation during his tenure).
111. Id. at 10.
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investigated through numerous cooperative investigations.
112
The
investigations uncovered a number of other scandals that resulted in “the
charging of more than 900 individuals” and allowed prosecutors to
“secure[] more than 200 convictions for crimes including corruption,
money laundering, and abuse of the financial system.”
113
Due to a large
case backlog, many of the persons implicated in these scandals have not
been convicted.
114
Some of the anti-corruption proposals were ultimately
incorporated into Brazil’s draft laws that were subsequently presented
before the nation’s Congress in early 2019.
115
A number of legal and institutional factors have propelled these
reforms.
116
First, the Brazilian attorney general (Ministério Público
Federal, MPF) has significant autonomy granted by the Brazilian
constitution.
117
This independence has allowed the attorney general to
pursue cases against high-profile leaders without fear of retaliation.
118
The
attorney general may also work with the Brazilian legal scheme, as
exemplified by a law entering into effect in 2013 that allows attorney to
reduce penalty for cooperative defendants.
119
During the Lavo Jato
investigation, Brazilian prosecutors granted at least 218 plea agreements as
part of their investigations.
120
Brazil has further benefitted from its ability
to use the resources provided by the United States and other nations.
121
Notably, during the Lavo Jato investigation, prosecutors “issued 269
formal requests for legal assistance to 45 countries.”
122
Brazil has also
received assistance from information cooperation and dialogue with the
U.S. Department of Justice and analogous offices of other nations; such
112. Id. at 23.
113. Id. at 22–23.
114. Id. at 23.
115. Id. at 9–10.
116. Id. at 23.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing Mutual Legal Assistance, U.S. Braz., Oct. 14, 1997, S. TREATYDOC.
NO. 105-42 (1998) (providing for bilateral cooperation in investigations between the
United States and Brazil because “[t]he bilateral treaty empowers both countries to
request assistance from one another, including taking the testimony or statements of
persons; providing documents, records, and items; locating or identifying persons or
items; serving documents; transferring persons in custody for testimony or other
purposes; executing requests for searches or seizures; assisting in proceedings relating
to immobilization and forfeiture of assets, restitution, and collection of fines; and any
other form of assistance not prohibited by law.”).
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cooperation has allowed for improved sharing of evidence and
information.
123
This increased coordination between the United States and
Brazil has allowed for coordinated prosecutions of large corporations that
violated the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”)
124
and Brazilian
anti-bribery laws.
125
These coordinated prosecutions have resulted in $1.9
billion and $4.4 million in payments to the United States and Brazil
respectively.
126
III. NATIONAL PROSECUTIONS, FAILED CASES
Reports by the Inter-American Development Bank (“IDB”), finding
earlier attempts to reduce corruption to be “uneven” in scope and efficacy,
have suggested that an “integrated approach” is needed to reduce pervasive
corruption.
127
The IDB acknowledged the importance of measures of
corruption developed by key ratings agencies, including Standard & Poor’s,
Fitch, and Moody’s.
128
If such ratings are unfavorable, a recipient country
is less likely to attract investment.
129
The IDB report suggested that the most meaningful efforts at reducing
corruption required action on behalf of private and public sector initiatives,
as well as community efforts.
130
The report concluded that “successfully
addressing corruption will require the concerted attention of both
governments and businesses, as well as the use of the latest advanced
technologies to capture, analyze, and share data to prevent, detect, and
deter corrupt behavior.”
131
U.S. government agencies have found comparable results. For example,
U.S. GAO has concluded that meaningful reduction in corruption must
come from multipronged initiatives that include backing from both
government officials, the private sector, and members of the public.
132
Other factors reducing corruption include promoting public “access to
123. BEITTEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 24.
124. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1998).
125. BEITTEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 23–24.
126. Id. at 24 (noting such companies found in violation include Braskem, Embraer,
Keppel Offshore and Marine, Odebrecht, Petrobras, Rolls Royce, and SMB Offshore).
127. Id. at 15–16.
128. Id. at 16.
129. Id.
130. See Combating Corruption, supra note 2 (finding that governments and
businesses must collaborate and use advancing technologies to fight corruption).
131. Id.
132. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-506, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: U.S.
ANTICORRUPTION PROGRAMS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN WILL REQUIRE TIME AND
COMMITMENT (Apr. 2014), https://www.gao.gov/assets/250/242162.pdf.
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government information.”
133
Like the IDB, U.S. GAO concluded that a
long-term approach must be considered, noting that “because corruption
cannot be eradicated quickly and simply, anti-corruption efforts require
long-term commitment to gain public confidence.”
134
A. National Anti-Corruption Efforts Have Largely Been Inadequate to
Reduce Corruption.
Countries have responded with different legislative initiatives as well as
the development of national courts in order to prosecute persons engaged in
corruption related to national projects.
For example, in Bangladesh, institutionalized corruption was deemed to
have reached “endemic proportions” in the years prior to 2007.
135
There,
Bangladesh’s anti-corruption efforts, among a variety of legislative
initiatives, including versions of the nation’s penal code dating to 1860, as
well as the 1947 Prevention of Corruption Act (“PCA”) and the 2004 Anti-
Corruption Act.
136
The PCA created the Anti-Corruption Commission
(“ACC”), which was charged with the sole responsibility for reducing
corruption within the nation through investigations and prosecutions.
137
Bangladesh is also a member of several international anti-corruption
treaties, including UNCAC. The ACC is directed by three commissioners
and a chairman who is appointed by the current President of Bangladesh.
138
In order to reduce bias by the Commission, Commission members are not
able to hold “any profitable office in the service of the Republic” upon
leaving the post.
139
Nevertheless, despite these efforts, corruption and
fraudulent conduct proliferated throughout the nation, particularly in the
form of bribery and civil servant corruption.
140
Further, prosecutions in
Bangladesh have largely failed to make a tangible impact on reducing
national corruption.
141
Prosecutions in Kenya have yielded similar results.
142
Like Bangladesh,
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Dev. Programme, Rep. of Anti-Corruption Assessment
Mission: Dhaka Bangladesh, at 7 (March 2–15, 2008) (stating that corruption in
Bangladesh has increased in the years leading up to January 11, 2007).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 15.
140. See id. at 16–17.
141. Id. at 19.
142. See Frequently Asked Questions About the Kenya Anti-Corruption
Commission, KENYA ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION 8–9, https://www.eacc.go.ke/wp-
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Kenya has established several anti-corruption initiatives, including the
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (“EACC”), which replaced the
Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (“KACC”) in 2011.
143
The EACC has
primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting corruption in
Kenya.
144
The EACC is comprised of “a Chairperson and four other
members appointed according to the provisions of the Constitution” and the
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 2011.
145
In addition to
investigation and prosecution, the EACC also engages in public outreach
and educational efforts to combat corruption.
146
Despite these efforts, as in
Bangladesh, Kenya continues to experience widespread corruption,
particularly in its public procurement and government sectors, with bribery
of government officials remaining widespread.
147
Further, a regional approach to combatting corruption has not proven to
successfully address fraudulent conduct across a regional bloc or group of
countries working together to combat corruption. For instance, during the
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption in
2004, some African nations joined together to reduce corruption across the
region.
148
Despite the argument that corruption may manifest itself
differently due to regional variations in governance structure and economic
metrics, regional efforts at quashing corruption have largely proven
ineffective due to the often inapposite national interests of each individual
nation.
149
Nations often have a vested interest in asset recovery and
regional investment, which reduces the efficacy of regional anti-corruption
commissions or courts.
150
Moreover, those nations that are most plagued
content/uploads/2018/08/KACC-FAQ-A5-Book.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2020).
143. About Us, ETHICS & ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION, http://www.eacc.go.ke/
about-us/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2020).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See Michel Arseneault, Anti-corruption Officials Suspended, Casting
Shadowing on Kenyan Transparency, RFI (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.english.rfi.fr/
africa/20150424-anti-corruption-officials-suspended-casting-shadow-kenyan-
transparency (finding that the recent political suspensions and investigations are a
major setback in efforts to end political corruption and other anti-graft efforts).
148. See Melissa Khemani, Corruption and the Violation of Human Rights: The
Case for Bringing the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating
Corruption within the Jurisdiction of the African Court and Human and Peoples’
Rights, 16 AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 213, 214 (2008) (noting the “crippling effects” of
corruption prompted Member States to adopt the Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption in 2003).
149. See id. at 214, 220.
150. See id. at 222.
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by corruption at the level of their government and public officials may not
possess the political stability to develop and assist in overseeing an
effective anti-corruption panel within the region.
151
B. MDB Sanctions Boards Are Limited in Prosecuting Corruption
National prosecutions of international corruption cases have failed to
make a noticeable impact on widespread corruption.
152
Under the current
framework, each MDB carries its own sanctioning process. Sanctions
board decisions of each body are enforceable as for projects by other
MDBs.
153
For instance, an entity that is debarred by the World Bank’s
Sanctions Board will often be unable, through reciprocity, to obtain a
contract from another MDB.
154
The vendors and entities deemed non-
responsible entities will be publicly listed and are ineligible to bid on or be
awarded World Bank projects.
155
On an MDB project, fraudulent conduct
may occur during project design, procurement, implementation, or during
the project’s later management.
Most prominently, the Integrity Vice Presidency (“INT”) of the World
Bank investigates and reviews possible allegations of corruption, and the
World Bank’s Sanctions Board issues sanctions.
156
Other MDBs abide by
the Sanctions Board decision when selecting analogous bid
procurements.
157
Reciprocity agreements — often known as cross-
debarment — are standard practice among the World Bank and comparable
MDBs.
158
Still, cross-debarment rarely occurs between a national
government and MBD or other institution.
159
As a result, an entity that has
been found corrupt and has been debarred by the World Bank or other
MDB may be eligible to obtain procurement for a project from a national
151. See id.
152. See Alina Mungiu-Pippidi & Niklas Kossow, Rethinking the Way We Do Anti-
Corruption, NATO REV. MAG., https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/also-in-2016/
anticorruption-corruption-laws-regulation-control-anticorrp-budget-index/en/index.htm
(last visited Feb. 26, 2020) (testing the effectiveness of various anti-corruption
strategies using quantitative methods).
153. See INFORMATIONNOTE, supra note 6, at 9.
154. See id. at 9–10.
155. See id. at 5.
156. See id. at 4 (defining the role of the “INT”).
157. See id. at 9 (implementing “cross-debarments” between the sanctions board and
MDBs).
158. See also id.
159. See Christopher R. Yukins, Cross-Debarment: A Stakeholder Analysis, 45
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 219, 221 (2013) (stating cross-debarment between
governments and other institutions is not yet common).
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agency elsewhere.
160
The World Bank has introduced several additional concrete efforts to
halt corruption, including the “introduction of a confidential hotline,
tightening of procurement guidelines, intensive audits of projects, and
support for improving procurement systems in client countries.”
161
The
World Bank also offers support to those countries requesting assistance in
investigating potential acts of corruption.
162
In addition to debarment, the World Bank and other MDBs have other
avenues to recover assets lost to corruption — for example, the United
Nations’ and World Bank’s Stolen Asset Recovery (“StAR”) Initiative.
163
The StAR Initiative, part of the Bank’s Governance and Anti-Corruption
Strategy, is a fairly recent effort to reclaim assets that had been allocated
for projects in developing nations.
164
Notably, the StAR initiative has been
able to take effect due to the implementation of the UN Convention
Against Corruption (“UNCAC”), which took effect in December 2005 and
will be discussed in greater detail later in this Article.
165
IV. EXISTING INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALSARENOT SUFFICIENT TO
PROSECUTE
A. Corruption: Limitations of the ICC
The limitations associated with standalone international courts, as was
seen by the experience of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”),
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
166
(“ICTR”), and International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
167
(“ICTY”), suggest that a
new judicial approach must be installed in order to successfully address
corruption. Because the ICTR and ICTY were specially created to
prosecute particularly heinous war crimes, this Article will only explore the
limitations of the ICC.
Founded in 2002 by the Rome Statute, the ICC is a special court that
160. See id.
161. JEFF HUTHER & ANSWAR SHAR, THE WORLD BANK, ANTI-CORRUPTION
POLICIES AND PROGRAMS: A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION (2000).
162. Id.
163. THE WORLD BANK, STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY (STAR) INITIATIVE:
CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES, ANDACTION PLAN (2007).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Int’l Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda, UNITED
NATIONS, http://unictr.irmct.org/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2020).
167. See Int’l Crim Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.icty.org/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2020).
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investigates and prosecutes individuals charged “with the gravest crimes of
concern to the international community: genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity and the crime of aggression.”
168
While the ICC has
launched investigations and prosecutions, leading to the public indictment
of over forty persons for grave crimes, the ICC has been criticized as slow
and inefficient.
169
Scholars have also suggested that there are three major concerns
associated with the ICC’s current mandate. First, the ICC has been
condemned for perpetuating imperialism through its focus on prosecuting
Africans.
170
Second, the ICC has been criticized for its failure to adhere to
the precedent of other tribunals.
171
Third, the ICC and other international
tribunals have been criticized for their lack of information-sharing across
tribunals.
172
Each of these criticisms will be discussed in turn.
The experience of the ICC suggests that, while effective in reducing
corruption in some capacity, international courts are often slow and are not
effective in reducing systemic corruption. Notably, the ICC has been
criticized for perpetuating imperialism by subjugating and marginalizing
Sub-Saharan African nations and has been slow and ineffective in carrying
out prosecutions.
173
Some critics of the ICC have alleged that the ICC has
placed a heightened focus upon prosecuting African nations that have
168. About the ICC, INT’L CRIM. CT., UNITED NATIONS, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/about (last visited Apr. 25, 2020).
169. See Anthony Wang, On the Failed Authority of the International Criminal
Court, INT’L POL’YDIG. (June 15, 2018), https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/06/15/on-the-
failed-authority-of-the-international-criminal-court/ (noting the ICC’s “deep
institutional bureaucracy” which slows its pace undermines public confidence in the
ability to deter future wrongdoers). See generally Home, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/defendants-wip.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2020).
170. See Jessica Hatcher-Moore, Is the World’s Highest Court Fit For Purpose?,
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-
professionals-network/2017/apr/05/international-criminal-court-fit-purpose.
171. See Gilbert Guillaume, The Use of Precedent by International Judges and
Arbitrators, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 5, 20 (2011) (highlighting the importance of
adhering to precedent in cases having the same legal issues).
172. OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, BRIEFING PAPER: ESTABLISHING
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR THE ICC 8 (2015), https://www.justiceinitiative.org/
uploads/b14d7fe9-0548-4b5e-9ebe-f97a6cf119ed/briefing-icc-perforamnce-indicators-
20151208.pdf (“The ICC does not have an institutional tradition of sharing information
across organs.”).
173. See, e.g., Ugamanim Bassey Obo & Dickson Ekpe, Africa and the
International Criminal Court: A Case of Imperialism By Another Name, 3 INT’L J.
DEV. & SUSTAINABILITY 2025, 2034 (2014), https://isdsnet.com/ijds-v3n10-6.pdf
(contending that the prosecutorial inertia the ICC exerts when crimes are committed by
dominant countries undermines justice for the larger pool of victims).
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previously been harmed by Colonialism and other Western “assistance.”
174
Furthermore, the ICC has been criticized for its views toward stare
decisis and precedent.
175
Although ICC decisions acknowledge the
findings of other international courts, the ICC specifically provides that the
decisions of the tribunals are not binding upon its decisions. Particularly,
in Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dujilo, the tribunal stated that “decisions of other
international courts and tribunals are not part of the directly applicable
law . . . .”
176
Although the ICC has reviewed the opinions of other courts,
the lack of an influential body of law reduces the efficacy and legitimacy of
the Court.
177
In addition, the ICC and other international tribunals have
been criticized for the lack of information-sharing processes across
tribunals. This lack of transparency has reduced the efficiency and
impartiality of these tribunals.
Despite the foregoing limitations, one approach that has been proposed
to reduce corruption is expanding the ICC’s mandate so that it can
prosecute acts of corruption.
178
However, some critics have suggested that
the ICC lacks the experience and resources to prosecute corruption.
179
The
ICC currently lacks investigators and lawyers with this expertise.
180
Likewise, domestic legal prosecutors likely will not have the expertise to
address corruption in other countries that may have differing customs and
cultures. Further, acts of corruption vary widely from each other.
181
Critics of expanding the ICC’s jurisdiction have also argued that,
because many of these investigations require undercover efforts and
cooperating witnesses, the ICC, which has limited relationship with
national law enforcement, would be unable to adequately conduct
174. Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Can the International Criminal Court Play Fair in
Africa?, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 17, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-
focus/2013/10/17/can-the-international-criminal-court-play-fair-in-africa/ (suggesting
that African countries were pressured to sign the EU treaty that intertwined colonialist
interests with those of African countries).
175. Guillaume, supra note 171, at 12–13.
176. Prosecutor v. Dujilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment Pursuant to Art. 74 of the
Stat., ¶ 603 (Mar. 14, 2012); Aldo Zammit Borda, Precedent in International Criminal
Courts and Tribunals, 2 CAMBRIDGE J. INT. & COMP. L. 287, 294 (2013).
177. See Borda, supra note 176, at 294–95 (highlighting a need to turn to external
decisions).
178. Alter & Sorensen, supra note 43 (“What international criminal law does best is
prosecute those most responsible, at the apex of the pyramid, when individual nations
are unwilling or unable to do so.”).
179. Id. (finding the infrastructure insufficient for prosecuting mass atrocities).
180. Id. (noting that war crimes require a different set of skills from those of
domestic approaches).
181. Id. (discussing a range of corruptions requiring specialized expertise).
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investigations.
182
For this reason, critics have argued that the ICC would be
unlikely to have the resources to investigate and prosecute corruption more
effectively than the lawmakers that are working at the national level.
183
Such critics have further suggested that bilateral treaties, particularly those
in the investor space, and other efforts to assist nations with additional
resources to prosecute corruption within their borders would be more
effective than another stand-alone international court.
184
As one example
of an ancillary mechanism to fight corruption, certain scholars have
proposed that international arbitration could play an increased role in
fighting corruption.
185
The investor-state dispute mechanisms play a key
role in ensuring that cross-border transactions are not befouled by
corruption.
186
Bilateral investment treaties typically provide for
international arbitration clauses to protect the investor and recipient state in
the event of a dispute, and has imbued transparency into these
agreements.
187
Applying similar efforts to agreements at risk for bribery
may be a more effective and less burdensome mechanism to reduce
corruption.
188
For these reasons, according to critics, the scope of ICC’s
responsibility should not be expanded to prosecute corruption.
V. A HYBRID, MIXED PROSECUTIONAPPROACH TO REDUCING
CORRUPTION ISNEEDED TO BUILDUPON EXISTINGNATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS
Due to the apparent shortcomings associated with a limited national
approach to anti-corruption, a more integrated cross-border approach must
be created. There has already been a number of promising efforts at
collaboration to reduce corruption.
189
Despite these promising early efforts,
182. Id.
183. See id. (reasoning that national level authorities are better equipped to handle
witnesses).
184. See id.; see also An Open Letter About Investor-State Dispute Settlement (April
2015), MCGILL (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.mcgill.ca/fortier-chair/isds-open-letter
(describing value of bilateral investment agreements in promoting transparency and
sovereignty). But see Leo O’Toole, Investment Arbitration: A Poor Forum for the
International Fight Against Corruption, YALE J. INT’L L. (Dec. 1, 2016),
https://www.yjil.yale.edu/investment-arbitration-a-poor-forum-for-the-international-
fight-against-corruption/ (arguing international arbitration a weak mechanism to reduce
corruption).
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See Hassan, supra note 93 (explaining how some countries have amended their
anti-corruption laws to expand the scope and extraterritorial application of the laws).
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more still must be done.
The United States has signaled its support for increased international
collaboration. Evidencing this support, Congress passed the International
Anticorruption and Good Governance Act in October 2000, which aims to
assist other countries “combat corruption throughout society and to
improve transparency and accountability at all levels of government and
throughout the private sector.”
190
However, the United States did not offer
new funding for anti-corruption efforts.
191
Most recently, the United States
has signaled it will assist with auditing initiatives to promote transparency.
As one example of these efforts, on March 1, 2019, GAO’s Center for
Audit Excellence announced that it had signed a Memorandum of
Understanding with the World Bank in its latest attempt to “strengthen
international accountability and promote good governance . . . [and] will
include “potential to coordinate on needs assessments, advisory services,
training, mentoring, internal controls, and performances audits, among
other areas.”
192
As will be described further below, increased transparency and
information sharing will be crucial in reducing corruption — evidence
suggests corruption is significantly reduced where such acts are visible.
193
Increased information sharing will also reduce duplication of efforts.
194
In tandem with improved information sharing, sanctions for corruption
must be created. As experienced by the Export-Import Bank of the United
States (“EXIM Bank”), prior to the creation of the Office of Inspector
General (“OIG”), entities and persons will not be deterred from engaging in
corrupt acts unless the penalties for such acts are steep.
195
Indeed, persons
190. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-506, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE; U.S.
ANTICORRUPTION PROGRAMS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA WILL REQUIRE TIME AND
COMMITMENT (Apr. 2014), https://www.gao.gov/assets/250/242162.pdf.
191. Id.
192. Press Release, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO’s Ctr. for Audit
Excellence & World Bank Begin New P’ship to Enhance Capacity of Accountability
Orgs. (Mar. 1, 2019) (on file with the author).
193. See Robert I. Rotberg, Accomplishing Anticorruption: Propositions and
Methods, 147 DAEDALUS J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 12 (2018) (citing Georgia’s
information-sharing reforms that led to reduced corruption).
194. This approach would not include increasing access to information, it would
include appropriate safeguards such that rogue governments would not misuse this
information.
195. EXPORT-IMPORTBANK OF THEUNITED STATES, OFFICE OF INSPECTORGENERAL,
FY 2020 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, 2 [hereinafter FY 2020
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION], https://www.exim.gov/sites/default/files/
congressional-resources/budet-justification/FY_2020_EXIM_CBJ_-_Compliant.pdf
(stating that pre-OIG enforcement attempts were unsuccessful because the penalties
“did not carry significant risk,” and “the lack of effective deterrence” served as an
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who engage in corruption engage in a cost-benefit analysis and will not
decide against such behavior until the risks outweigh the rewards.
196
In light of the foregoing arguments, a unified anti-corruption sanctioning
body must be created.
A. Where Prior Anti-Corruption Conventions Have Fallen Short:
Weaknesses of the OECD Convention on Bribery
International conventions and treaties on corruption have presented early
first attempts at an international effort to reduce corruption; however, such
efforts have not adequately mitigated corruption or its effects. Such early
attempts to coordinate anti-corruption laws suggest additional unification is
possible.
Most prominently, in 1994 the OECD created the OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business
Transactions (“OECD Anti-Bribery Convention”), which “requires its
parties to criminalize the bribery of foreign public officials in international
business transactions.”
197
The Convention was ratified in 1997 by twenty-
nine member countries.
198
The OECD, founded in 1961 with aims of promoting worldwide
economic progress, currently has thirty-nine parties to the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention.
199
Thirty-four of these members are OECD member
countries, while five Convention members, including South Africa, Russia,
Bulgaria, Brazil, and Argentina, are not currently OECD members.
200
As
part of the OECD’s efforts to reduce corruption, nations including the
United States have taken steps to implement anti-corruption efforts
postulated during the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.
201
incentive for other parties to defraud EXIM Bank).
196. See Combatting Corruption, supra note 2 (explaining that increasing the costs
of engaging in corrupt conduct by enhancing accountability and strengthening
enforcement mechanisms is key to effective deterrence); see also FY 2020
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 195, at 2 (“An active program of
investigating and arresting foreign nationals responsible for fraudulent schemes has
been implemented and has generated results.”).
197. CRIMINAL DIV. OF U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & ENF’T DIV. OF THE U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 7
(Nov. 14, 2012) [hereinafter A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015
/01/16/guide.pdf.
198. Hassan, supra note 93.
199. A RESOURCEGUIDE TO THEU.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICESACT, supra note
197, at 7.
200. Id.
201. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STEPS TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES TO IMPLEMENT
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The OECD also has a Working Group on bribery, which considers
potential avenues to reduce corruption.
202
The Working Group further
assists with the implementation and oversight of such anti-bribery
efforts.
203
All members of the Anti-Bribery Convention participate in the
Bribery Working Group.
204
Colombia has also been invited to join the
Working Group.
205
The Working Group implements recommendations set forth in the Anti-
Bribery Convention.
206
The Working Group engages in a quarterly peer
review to monitor whether member states are adequately implementing the
provisions of the Anti-Bribery Convention.
207
The Working Group also
sets forth a peer-review monitoring system that assesses whether a
country’s domestic laws adequately implement the Convention, whether
such laws are effective, and whether a country is adequately conducting
enforcement actions when corruption is identified.
208
However, the OECD Convention has significant limitations, including
the fact that it has no jurisdiction over non-signatories or other nations that
choose not to accept its jurisdiction.
209
Further, the OECD solely
implements the domestic anti-corruption laws of a particular nation, but
does not provide for a single body to oversee efforts to prosecute
corruption affecting multiple nations concurrently.
210
B. UNCAC Has Failed to Adequately Address Corruption.
Like the OECD, the U.N. Convention Against Corruption (“UNCAC”)
has been unable to adequately prosecute acts of corruption. UNCAC was
passed by the U.N. General Assembly on October 31, 2003, and took effect
on December 14, 2005.
211
Like the OECD Convention, UNCAC requires
AND ENFORCE THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION (Feb. 25, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2013/03/19/2013-02-
25-steps-taken-oecd-anti-bribery-convention.pdf (describing enforcement resources
and actions by the United States).
202. A RESOURCEGUIDE TO THEU.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICESACT, supra note
197, at 7.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Hassan, supra note 93.
206. A RESOURCEGUIDE TO THEU.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICESACT, supra note
197, at 7.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See Anna Souza, The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Changing the Current
of Trade, 97 J. DEV. ECON. 73, 73 (2012).
210. See Hassan, supra note 93, at 13–14.
211. See A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, supra
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that signatories prosecute acts of corruption and sets forth a peer-review
mechanism to review anti-corruption laws of the signatories.
212
UNCAC
also “establishes guidelines for the creation of anti-corruption bodies, codes
of conduct for public officials, transparent and objective systems of
procurement, and enhanced accounting and auditing standards for the
private sector.”
213
UNCAC has broader support than the OECD
Convention, with 163 countries as members.
214
UNCAC draws upon earlier international efforts to prosecute corruption,
such as the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (“IACAC”),
which was the first international convention on anti-corruption and was
ratified in March 1996 by member states of the Organization of American
States.
215
Like the OECD and UNCAC, member parties to the IACAC
must criminalize bribery and other acts of corruption.
216
Compliance with
the IACAC is monitored by the Mechanism for Follow-Up on the
Implementation of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
(“MESICIC”).
217
There are currently thirty-one countries subject to the
MESICIC.
218
Similarly, in 1999, the Council of Europe set forth its own anti-
corruption efforts in the form of the Group of States Against Corruption
(“GRECO”).
219
GRECO oversees whether adopting nations have complied
with European anti-corruption laws, including prohibitions on bribery.
220
GRECO member states are not required to be part of the Council of
Europe.
221
The United States, along with forty-five European nations, are
currently GRECO members.
222
However, UNCAC, IACAC, and GRECO’s efficacy is marred by many
of the same limitations that the OECD Convention faces. Like the OECD
Convention, anti-corruption efforts under these treaties cannot be enforced
against non-signatories.
223
Further, efforts pursuant to these treaties merely
note 197; see also Hassan, supra note 93.
212. A RESOURCEGUIDE TO THEU.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICESACT, supra note
197, at 8.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See id. at 7–8 (explaining that although all signatories to anti-corruption treaties
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assist nations in implementing domestic laws of corruption but do not have
a single body, tribunal, or other mechanism to oversee efforts where
multiple nations are affected by corruption, or where an individual nation
lacks resources to adequately prevent or prosecute pervasive corruption
occurring within its borders.
C. Current Efforts Ignore Certain Negative
Ramifications Associated with Prosecuting Corruption
Finally, many of the foregoing international efforts have failed to address
certain negative ramifications associated with prosecuting corruption. For
example, sanctioning an entity, thus barring it from participating in public
works contracts, could lead to bankruptcy of that entity, which would in
turn lead to unemployed workers.
224
If the public works contractor is a
large firm, as was Odebrecht, its bankruptcy could lead to significant
unemployment in the region.
225
Such bankruptcy could destabilize the
immediate region and may prevent the public infrastructure project from
being created altogether.
226
D. The Export-Import Bank of the United States Provides a Mixed
Prosecution Model to Halt Corruption
The EXIM Bank bears certain structural similarities to MDBs and
engages in large-scale cross-border transactions in nations around the
world. The EXIM Bank is the official export credit agency of the United
States and engages in lending transactions that are considered too risky for
the private sector to pursue.
227
Loans through the EXIM Bank are backed
through the full faith and credit of the United States.
228
Despite the
inherent risks associated with these transactions, the EXIM Bank maintains
a consistently low default rate.
229
The Bank’s low default rate may be
review and assist in monitoring the implementation of anti-corruption efforts in
signatory countries, each signatory must enact their own domestic and foreign anti-
corruption laws).
224. See BEITTEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 36 (stating that “a key constraint on firms
being barred from public works contracts because of corruptions is the threat of
bankruptcy . . . .”).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. About Us, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES,
https://www.exim.gov/about (last visited Apr. 25, 2020) (“When private sector lenders
are unable or unwilling to provide financing, EXIM fills in the gap for American
businesses by equipping them with the financing tools necessary to compete for global
sales.”).
228. Id.
229. Id.
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attributed to the agency’s Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”), which
conducts audits, inspections, and investigations on behalf of the Bank.
230
The EXIM Bank’s approach differs significantly from that of
development banks in a key way — instead of merely waiting until the
corruption has progressed and then “debarring” or taking other retaliatory
action against an entity, the EXIM Bank can take steps to stop the
corruption immediately and may rely upon the assistance of the U.S.
Department of Justice and other agencies to reclaim misappropriated
assets.
231
The EXIM Bank has emphasized to Congress the OIG’s
significant ability to halt corruption, noting that before OIG’s creation,
EXIM’s “limited investigative and prosecutive efforts in prior years
contributed to a perception that defrauding EXIM Bank did not carry
significant risk, particularly for foreign parties,” and that “[t]he lack of
effective deterrence encouraged others to attempt similar crimes.”
232
The OIG has been very effective: since 2009, its efforts have led to 104
indictments or “informations” and eighty convictions.
233
The OIG, assisted
by the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), has recovered $340 million in
misappropriated funds, despite having an operating budget of only $41
million during the same period.
234
The OIG and the DOJ have also arrested
defendants on criminal charges in a number of foreign countries including
United Arab Emirates, Argentina, and Mexico.
235
The EXIM Bank has also increasingly relied upon technology and
information sharing to reduce the likelihood of nonrepayment. Prior to
approving a financial transaction, the agency looks at self-certifications,
credit reports, and reports by third party vendors, such as Thomson Reuters
World Check database, which “currently checks over 20 different watch
lists and other databases, including list of entities excluded from doing
230. FY 2020 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 195, at 2–4
(“Pursuant to current law, the OIG is required to supervise and report on the audit of
the Bank’s annual financial statements, audit compliance with the Federal Information
Security Modernization Act (FISMA), report on the Bank’s compliance with the
Improper Payments laws, conduct a risk assessment of the Bank’s purchase card
programs, and comply with auditing, inspection, and investigations standards,
including the Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS), Quality
Standards for Inspections and Evaluation, and the Attorney General’s Guidelines for
Investigations.”).
231. Id. at 2 (reasoning that OIG’s active scheme of investigating and arresting
foreign nationals deters foreign nationals from defrauding EXIM Bank).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 2–3.
235. Id.
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business with the federal government.”
236
E. U.S. Prosecution of Cross-Border Corruption
Further Depicts How a Multifaceted Approach
May Be Employed to Address Corruption.
The United States has other mechanisms in place to prosecute acts of
corruption that violate U.S. law but occur outside the U.S. border. For
potential violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (“FCPA”),
DOJ’s FCPA Unit works closely with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
(“FBI”) International Corruption Unit to investigate and reclaim lost
assets.
237
The Department of Homeland Security and the Internal Revenue
Service’s Criminal Investigation Unit also assist with FCPA
investigations.
238
Where applicable, the Department of Treasury’s Office
of Foreign Assets Control provides additional assistance in FCPA cases.
239
If cross-border diplomatic efforts are needed to address acts of
corruption, the Department of State will usually engage in such efforts.
240
The Department of State also promotes U.S. interests in reducing
corruption and promoting transparency through building foreign capacity
for anti-corruption efforts and entering into international treaties aiming to
reduce corruption.
241
The United States has provided annual support of up
to $1 billion to promote anti-corruption efforts overseas.
242
For these reasons, a new hybrid mechanism to prosecute corruption must
be created to act in tandem with prior efforts. This new mechanism would
not supplant efforts by the OECD Convention, UNCAC, IACAC, and
GRECO, among other bodies, but instead would merely provide an
additional avenue to investigate and prosecute corruption where these
mechanisms fall short.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
While some other authors have postulated the creation of an international
236. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-337, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK:
EXIM SHOULD EXPLORE USING AVAILABLE DATA TO IDENTIFY APPLICANTS WITH
DELINQUENT FEDERAL DEBT 17–18 (2019), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/699
291.pdf.
237. A RESOURCEGUIDE TO THEU.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICESACT, supra note
197, at 5.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 6.
241. Id.
242. Id.
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anti-corruption court akin to other large international courts (such as the
ICTY), such a court would initially be too unwieldy, expensive, and
inefficient to meaningfully reduce corruption.
243
Instead, a gradual increase
in collaboration in investigating and prosecuting corruption is needed.
Established in multiple phases, a hybrid international anti-corruption
“court” that possesses the capacity to both investigate acts of corruption
and bring claims against those persons or entities should be created. The
proposed court would have unique jurisdiction — it would be able to
review acts of corruption associated with MDB projects, national projects,
governments, and other institutions. The court would also create binding
and nonbinding precedent, which it may use in subsequent decisions. The
use of precedent will assist in predictability and efficiency.
244
For this
approach to be effective, national governments would need to recognize the
legitimacy of the court and would need to engage in information sharing
with the court officials and investigators. This new body would also have
authority to impose stricter sanctions on those persons or entities found to
have engaged in corruption and would rely upon the assistance of national
and international police forces and agencies to enforce its penalties.
A multi-phased approach for addressing corruption in large-scale
international development projects would be most effective in allowing the
court to gain legitimacy and would enable the court to acquire resources
(both in terms of fiscal resources and expertise). During this initial phase, a
unified sanctions board to prosecute acts of corruption affecting large-scale
projects and investments must be created. Initially, the proposed board
would involve only select entities, including other MDBs and public
agencies overseeing risky cross-border transactions. The unified sanctions
board could gradually be expanded to initially include those nations
seeking outside assistance in investigating and prosecuting corruption.
However, the board’s scope would gradually expand to be accessible to,
243. Compare approach presented here (advocating for a malleable structure based
upon increased collaboration and information-sharing between countries, and gradual
implementation to promote legitimacy), with proposal outlined by Mark L. Wolf, The
World Needs an International Anti-Corruption Court, 147 DAEDALUS, J. AM.
ACADEMY ARTS & SCIENCES 144, 145 (2018) (proposing creation of a formal
international anti-corruption court). While the author here believes that the creation of
a formal international anti-corruption court would not be disadvantageous, a phasic
approach that incorporates increased information-sharing and increases penalties is
likely to be more effective in reducing widespread corruption and less expensive.
Pursuant to this approach, different bodies could use information sharing to reduce
duplication of efforts. The decisions of such bodies could then be used by other bodies
to promote economy (even to the extent that the decisions of one body are not binding
on another body).
244. Borda, supra note 176, at 298 (explaining that using external judicial decisions
has apparent efficiency benefits).
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and assist with, anti-corruption efforts for other UN organizations and
national entities, though membership and jurisdiction would be wholly
voluntary.
The proposed unified sanctions board would possess its own
investigative body. This investigative body would be able to provide
assistance to countries that prefer to conduct their own investigations
internally. Further, although members would be capable of investigating
and prosecuting cases in front of the unified sanctions board, prosecution
could also be held before a national court or other international tribunal.
As the second phase of this approach, a full international anti-corruption
court could be created, with its jurisdiction gradually expanded as the court
develops a body of case law that would serve as precedent. This anti-
corruption court would be derived from the initial phase’s unified sanctions
board. The proposed anti-corruption court would be complementary to
existing regimes, meaning that if individual nations are adept to investigate
and prosecute corruption within their country, then they would continue to
be able to prosecute internally through their nation’s courts. However, the
international anti-corruption court’s investigators and judges would have
specialized expertise in prosecution and asset recovery that national
governments often lack.
245
Another advantage of submitting to the court’s
jurisdiction would be the ability to harmonize the current regulations,
which would provide a more unified international approach against
fraudulent conduct. Further, unlike the ICC, the court would adhere to
existing precedent and could rely upon its own prior decisions or the
decisions of national governments.
246
There are many advantages to this proposal. The creation of a new,
unified sanctions board and an anti-corruption court for the MDBs and UN
agencies will help with alleviating some of the shortcomings found in the
current system, whereby each MDB prosecutes corruption through its own
245. Wolf, supra note 243, at 145 (providing the example that the United States
does not allow district attorneys to prosecute local officials due to lack of legal
expertise).
246. Compare Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC., 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (reaffirming
the principle of stare decisis because it promotes predictable and consistent
development of legal principles, reliance on judicial decisions, and perceived integrity
of the judicial process), with Guillaume, supra note 165, at 9 (stating that the Court’s
precedent is not binding, and it will not abide by stare decisis), and Borda, supra note
175, at 294 (reporting that international courts consistently find external judicial
decisions are merely persuasive and not binding), and Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-
01/06, Judgment Pursuant to Art. 74 of the Statute, ¶ 603 (Mar. 14, 2012) (finding that
opinions of international courts are excluded from the directly applicable law under
article 21 of the Statute).
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sanctioning entity.
247
The creation of a new, unified sanctions board will
provide a more harmonized and consistent approach to the problem of
corruption and will impose a stronger and clearer signal to entities and
individuals contemplating fraudulent conduct. A unified sanctions board
would also address more efficiently the transparency limitations in the
current reciprocity approach.
248
For instance, it will help promote
information sharing and ensure that debarred entities are unable to continue
to procure bids.
Once fully established, the proposed “court” would also be effective in
prosecuting acts of corruption that span across multiple nations, as was
seen in the Odebrecht scandal.
249
The court must have the capacity to
investigate and prosecute both large- and small-scale acts of corruption —
as one example, two divisions within the court, a “small-scale corruption
division” and a “large-scale corruption division” (divided by the potential
amount of lost funds) may be created, so that each type of case is given
appropriate consideration. Such a court would be particularly beneficial for
developing nations, where key government officials have frequently been
found to accept bribes in exchange for certain acts or awards.
250
Allowing
the international anti-corruption court to prosecute acts of corruption means
that these nations can rely upon an outside, third-party resource to provide
anti-corruption expertise and authority when the nation acting alone may
not. The international anti-corruption court would also be able to impose
fines and sanctions upon entities in multiple nations in a single decision or
opinion, thus increasing efficiency and saving time and resources. In
imposing sanctions, the court would be required to consider the potential
effects on the immediate populace (such as unemployment and
displacement) associated with possible penalties.
251
247. See supra Parts III, IV.
248. See also INFORMATION NOTE, supra note 6, at 9 (stating that the Bank Group’s
‘cross debarments’ of other MDB’s debarments are not subject to its sanctions process,
and the Bank Group Management itself reviews the Bank Group’s decisions to opt out
of a specific debarment decision).
249. See BEITTEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 9 (demonstrating successful prosecution
of corruption by multiple nations with international support after an initial settlement
agreement between Brazil, Switzerland, and the United States).
250. See id. at 6, 10 (noting the “long-time practice of businesses and foreign
corporations paying bribes to gain contracts in developing countries,” as evidenced by
arrests of former presidents Temer and Inacio Lula da Silva as well as other high-level
government officials in Brazil in association with Odebrecht bribery investigations).
251. Id. at 36 (noting approaches to combatting anti-corruption should reflect
country-specific circumstances especially since resisting corruption may result in
bankruptcy of companies and have “destabilizing economic consequences” which leave
many unemployed).
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The proposed international anti-corruption mechanism will also be
hallmarked by collaborative asset-recovery capacities, similar to those
efforts that U.S. agencies and the EXIM Bank have installed.
252
The court
could utilize national police forces (of both the affected nation and other
nations) and intelligence to recover funds otherwise lost to corruption.
This asset-recovery ability will allow the international anti-corruption court
to, over time, fund its own operations by taking a portion of the reclaimed
funds. Like the EXIM Bank’s OIG, the international anti-corruption court,
when fully utilized, will be able to return its operating budget by multiple
times.
253
By allowing for information sharing and enforcement with
signatory nations, the proposed court will also have the knowledge and
police power to implement its decisions. Finally, as experienced by the
EXIM Bank,
254
the penalties for engaging in corruption must be heightened
— if actors believe that the penalties for engaging in corruption are
particularly severe, then they will be deterred from engaging in future acts
of corruption.
The proposed approach is described below:
1. Create a new, unified sanctions board for national governments,
MDBs and UN agencies to bring allegations of corruption and bribery.
The number of tiers and specific structure is not expressly described
here, but the intention is for the board to become multi-tiered over time
to prosecute corrupt acts of various magnitudes and types.
A new, unified sanctions board and a system for MDBs and UN agencies
to investigate and prosecute allegations of fraudulent conduct should be
created. The number of tiers of the proposed unified sanctions board may
be dictated based upon the relative need and the structure most beneficial to
promote efficiency and ensure effective adjudication of allegations.
However, the proposed structure would likely trend toward a more
involved, multi-tiered mechanism, in which recourse for varied forms of
252. FY 2020 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 195, at 2–3
(noting the EXIM OIG was created to combat the perception that one could defraud the
EXIM Bank without any repercussion. Now, the EXIM OIG and the U.S. Department
of Justice arrest violators “who have attempted to defraud the Bank or affiliated
financial institutions.” After the arrests, defendants will then repay any outstanding
amounts on transactions to the EXIM Bank.).
253. Id. (stating that even by conservative estimates OIG has saved the federal
government “several multiples of its budget”).
254. Id. (stating that pre-OIG enforcement attempts were unsuccessful because the
penalties “did not carry significant risk,” and “the lack of effective deterrence” served
as an incentive for other parties to defraud EXIM Bank).
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corruption or bribery would be available through separate channels. Once
it becomes operational, the proposed structure will likely have at least two
tiers and involve both public and private sector actors, meaning that cases
could be brought by public or private entities affected by corruption during
large-scale projects or investments. Additionally, separate allegations for
corruption or wrongdoing could be brought against public servants outside
of the scope of large-scale projects if a signatory requests outside assistance
in adjudicating such a case (due to bias of government prosecutors or a lack
of resources, for example).
2. Incorporate information-sharing provisions that would facilitate the
unified board’s access to information and serve as a potential conduit
for information sharing between national agencies.
Second, the unified board’s structure should incorporate information-
sharing provisions that would facilitate the tribunal’s access to information,
as well as serve as a potential conduit for information sharing between
national agencies. As noted above, one criticism that has marred the ICC is
the tribunal’s lack of transparency and its failure to effectively incorporate
precedent.
255
The proposed structure would more effectively integrate
precedent through information sharing. Certain investigative materials
created by national prosecutors could be made available to the unified
board in order to prevent duplication of efforts and ensure that any decision
by the board is accurate and based upon a thorough investigation. One way
to address the weaknesses inherent in the existing system would be to make
the new body be an implementing agency for the information-sharing parts
of UNCAC.
3. Expand the unified board to address administrative actions against
civil servants engaging in corrupt acts or accepting bribes as part of
their official duties.
Third, the unified sanctions board structure should be gradually
expanded to address, investigate, and prosecute administrative actions
against civil servants who have been accused of committing fraudulent
conduct. This will expand upon the scope and efficacy of the court’s reach.
Initially, the court will not prosecute criminal acts.
255. See OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 172, at 2 (proposing the ICC
implement performance indicators in response to an increased demand from States for
enhanced efficiency and transparency for States evaluation of the ICC’s performance).
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4. Expand the unified board to address criminal cases against civil
servants who have engaged in criminal wrongdoing relating to large-
scale projects. Allegations may be brought by MDBs, UN agencies,
national governments, or other similar agencies that cannot effectively
prosecute the wrongdoing without the assistance of an impartial body.
Fourth, the unified board’s structure should be gradually expanded to
address, investigate, and prosecute criminal cases against civil servants
who have been accused for committing fraudulent conduct affecting large-
scale projects, including projects for which government bids or solicitations
are required. Starting with administrative actions and extending the court’s
authority to criminal cases will help the unified board to gradually
transition into an anti-corruption court, as will be detailed in the following
section.
5. Create an international anti-corruption “court” to address fraud,
corruption, and bribery in large scale projects awarded by national
governments, MDBs, UN agencies, or similar agencies, as well as
smaller allegations of corruption against civil servants in which a
national body may be unable to impartially or effectively adjudicate.
Fifth, an international anti-corruption “court” should be created. The
proposed international anti-corruption court will be created out of the
unified sanctions board and the system for prosecuting allegations for
fraudulent conduct for MDBs and UN agencies as outlined in the initial
phase. This court should have its own judges, which are elected through a
democratic mechanism.
The proposed international anti-corruption court can be distinguished
from the preceding unified sanctions board, as the court will have a
significantly broader jurisdiction and will be accessible to national
governments, governing bodies, MDBs, and UN agencies around the
world.
256
However, the jurisdiction of the international anti-corruption
court will remain complementary to existing regimes. Thus, if an
individual nation believes that it has the ability to prosecute corruption
internally and within its borders, that nation will have the ability to do so.
This means that the international anti-corruption court’s jurisdiction must
be adopted by the governing nation and may reduce the court’s efficacy.
Nations will need to expressly sign onto the international anti-corruption
court’s jurisdiction.
256. See INFORMATION NOTE, supra note 6, at 15 (detailing the current unified
sanctions board’s jurisdiction).
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Despite this shortcoming, there remain numerous advantages that nations
will likely find to be strong motivation to become a member of the
international anti-corruption court. The first advantage of joining the
international anti-corruption court will be that the court shall possess its
own investigators, who will be specially trained in complex international
investigations and asset recovery. Instances of corruption often cross
international borders, and an anti-corruption body within a single nation,
acting alone, is often unable to effectively quash transnational corruption
without the assistance of an overarching, supra-national body.
257
The
court’s investigators will also be trained to have particular expertise in asset
recovery, including for those transactions whereby money or other assets
have crossed national borders. For example, money-laundering cases often
implicate a variety of different laws, cross international borders and require
a team of sophisticated investigators to be able to analyze and resolve
effectively.
258
The second advantage of joining the international anti-corruption court is
that the court will be able to rectify the disputes involving corruption and
fraudulent conduct that implicate more than one nation. Although the
opposing nations would need to submit to the international anti-
corruption’s jurisdiction, the court will help to impugn impartiality and
fairness and will assist with maintaining positive relations among nations.
Finally, the third advantage associated with joining the international anti-
corruption court is that the court will be more effective in identifying and
enforcing allegations of corruption and will help to fill the gaps in anti-
corruption enforcement where individual nations, MDBs, and UN bodies,
working through treaties and reciprocity agreements, have been unable to
do so.
259
There is one aspect of the proposed approach that must be clarified —
the author does not agree with the formalistic approach for the creation of a
true “international anti-corruption court” created in the image of the ICC,
ICTY, or ICTR.
260
Such rigid courts have many pitfalls, including the fact
257. See Webb, supra note 37, at 192–93 (“The flow of information, money, drugs,
and arms across borders has also destroyed the illusion of corruption as a domestic
political issue to be left to individual countries.”).
258. See id. at 210–11.
259. Wolf, supra note 20, at 1 (“An International Anti-Corruption Court would have
the potential to erode the widespread culture of impunity, [and] contribute to creating
conditions conducive to the democratic election of honest officials in countries which
have long histories of grand corruption.”).
260. See About the ICC, UNITEDNATIONS, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about (last visited
Mar. 21, 2020) (asserting the ICC was established by the Rome Statute which serves as
the court’s guiding legal document); see also International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.icty.org/en/about (last visited Apr.
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that these entities are expensive and otherwise not cost-effective.
261
Such
courts have also been criticized for being slow in their prosecution of
persons engaged in international crimes. Here, the proposed approach
would take into account the fact that corruption is a widespread problem
perpetuated by smaller actors. Consequently, there must be a mechanism
to prosecute both large-scale and small-scale actors. The international anti-
corruption court shall develop mechanisms to prosecute both larger and
smaller acts of corruption. Such an approach would be akin to the U.S.
court system, which has both a small claims division, as well as divisions
for more significant crimes.
262
Understanding that corruption arises on
both a large and small scale, driven by both large and small actors, is key to
effectively prosecuting corruption. Importantly, the anti-corruption court
would also at least partially fund its operating expenses by reclaiming a
portion of the funds otherwise lost to corruption.
VII. CONCLUSION
To conclude, there is a critical need to create an international anti-
corruption enforcement body and gradually expand its jurisdiction. A
streamlined, unified approach is vital to rectifying the shortcomings of the
current system. This Article postulates that there is a value in gradually
establishing an international mechanism for prosecuting corruption cases.
Given the weaknesses of many nations’ capacity and political will to deter
fraudulent acts, moving toward a unified system may assist in reducing
corruption in those nations where it is most likely to occur.
25, 2020) (stating the ICTY was established in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN
Charter); International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda,
UNITED NATIONS, http://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal (last visited last Apr. 25, 2020)
(stating the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established by Resolution
955 of the UN Security Council).
261. See International Criminal Court: 12 Years, $1 Billion, 2 Convictions, FORBES
(Mar. 12, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddavenport/2014/03/12/inter
national-criminal-court-12-years-1-billion-2-convictions-2/#26b9565e2405 (observing
that many question whether the ICC is too expensive and ineffective to justify given its
conviction rate and total expenditures in obtaining them); see also Rupert Skilbeck,
Funding Justice: The Price of War Crimes Trials, 15 AM. U. HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF 1
(2008), https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&https
redir=1&article=1028&context=hrbrief (claiming the ICTYR spent $1.2 billion (762
million euros) and the ICTR spent $1 billion (635 million euros) in ten years of
operating, a cost of between $10–15 million (6.4–9.5 million euros) per accused).
262. Introduction to the Federal Court System, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/federal-courts (last visited Apr. 25, 2020)
(explaining the federal court system).
